East African Littoral Countries: How Unity and Diversity are Characteristic of Third World Countries


The Third World encompasses a wide range of countries with different problems and stages of development but in spite of this, a certain unity in comparable economic and social problems can be observed (Prothero 1973a: 1). Dickenson et al. et al. (1983) and Gertzel (1994: 41) indicate that poverty is a common characteristic of Third World countries. The occurrence of ‘Third World’ conditions is often related to a vicious circle of poverty entrapment due to a spiralling deterioration of sources of nutrition, health and wealth due, in part, to deficiencies in education, natural resources and population control superimposed on the varied physiographic regions (see Fordham 1974: 197-202; Dickenson et al. et al. 1983: 16; Biya 1988: 5-6). Additionally, political instability has been shown to reduce growth although African nations that have greater political freedom have been shown to grow faster than those with less (Savvides 1995: 453-454).

The argument follows the thought that Western-style development was not an appropriate model. However, since writing this in 1997 (but stemming from an interest in the region that went back to 1995) it is notable that not a great deal of progress has happened. Indeed, old cycles seem to re-emerge and some countries civil societies have caved in despite a more enlightened ‘Western’ development model.

Often, the solution to Third World deprivation has been to impose the Western mode of development upon nations which has often had as a precept the multiplier effect (Dickenson et al. et al. 1983: 16-17; O’Conner 1988). However, this, according to Dickenson et al. (1983) had not been successful in overall improvement and development (p. 17). O’Conner (1988) brings an example of this to light where rural to urban migration has not occurred due a rise in the need of industrial labor, but rather because urban life is (or is perceived to be) a better way of life relative to rural living (p. 353-355). Indeed, it was a rather forgone conclusion to Gamst (1970) that the predominantly rural civilization of Ethiopia would be urbanized because of ‘global modernization’ (p. 392). The waxing and waning in the levels of international support for Tanzania’s strategy of nationalization/liberalization also illustrates this point (see Costello 1994).

Ashford (1964) declared that the nation building and post-colonial and revolutionary construction that Africa had to achieve was on a scale seldom observed in human history (p. 34): Western ideals should therefore not be applied. By way of explanation though, it may be reasoned that to counter anti-colonialism, European powers post World War 2 encouraged the doctrine of rich nations helping the poor (McCall 1955: 152). (The United Nations ‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’ (1960) found that colonialism was contrary to fundamental human rights; this is thought by Boswell (1989) to mark the end of colonial empires (p. 183)). Despite the rhetoric about self-assertion by the West, there was still a distinct lack of African perspectives being drawn upon to solve their own dilemmas (see Low 1964 esp. page 30) as well as imposing of Western modes of economic reasoning upon the African nations development achievements (see Johnson 1994). Taylor (1985) suggests that people in the Third World know they are poor (due to transborder information flows) (p.158), which exacerbates the motives and operational implementation of development strategies. Coupled with this is that the main drivers for modernization have tended in Africa to be an urban elite, out of line with traditional society (Calvez 1973: 257).

Dickenson et al. (1983) pointed out that the Third World has to re-evaluate its position post colonialism (p. 19). Indeed, colonial rule, as well as subsequent independence has been a commonality (O’Conner 1988: 348) (Table 1). Despite this ‘unity’, O’Conner (1988) states that ethnic identity (as distinct from clan identity) has been prevalent (p. 348; see also Tekle 1996; Markakis 1996). Continuing on this line he suggests that these very identities have lead to armed conflict/civil war that has fragmented nation-building efforts (p. 349-350; see also Prothero 1973b: 470-471; Tschirley & Weber 1994: 160, 162-3). This has been further shattered by an overarching insecurity brought about by fears of inter-regionalism and globalization (Macchia 1955: 50; King & Schneider 1991: 90-91) (Turnbull (1964) to an extent counters this view). The impact of colonial rule in post-colonial administration has also continued to aggravate social development and administration reform with respect to indigenous aspirations (see Kameri-Mbote & Cullet 1997:27).

Egypt

Independence: 28 February 1922 (from UK)

Sudan

Independence: 1 January 1956 (from Egypt and UK)

Eritrea

Independence: 27 May 1993 (from Ethiopia; formerly the Eritrea Autonomous Region)

Djibouti

Independence: 27 June 1977 (from France)

Somalia

Independence: 1 July 1960 (from a merger of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland)

Kenya

Independence: 12 December 1963 (from UK)

Tanzania

Tanganyika became independent 9 December 1961 (from UK-administered UN trusteeship); Zanzibar became independent 19 December 1963 (from UK); Tanganyika united with Zanzibar 26 April 1964

Mozambique

Independence: 25 June 1975 (from Portugal)

South Africa

Independence: 31 May 1910 (from UK)

 Table 1. Independence dates of East African littoral states from colonial administrations. Source: CIA (1997)

 Such problems though, as Biya (1988) enunciates, should be solved by Africans themselves (p. 6; see also Prothero 1973b: 475-476). Further to this, he wished to see a focus on recognition of these essentially cultural differences and work with these needs in mind to better direct development and welfare (p. 10). Almost twenty years before he wrote this, the Organization of African Unity put forward the Lagos Plan in 1970; it was a result of African leaders and scholars setting forth a basic plan of action to emphasis the importance of national and self collective self-reliance (Truett & Truett 1992:457). Further, it sought to establish an African Economic Community (Truett & Truett 1992: 457). The United Nations established the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in 1958 with a mandate to support economic and social development in Africa (UNECA 1997). It has been characteristic that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) while often supplying physical aid have also played crucial roles in governance (Hirst & Thompson 1995: 432; see also Brinkerhoff & Kulibaba 1996). There has been a corresponding growth in NGOs operations as crisis in the third world have escalated in the last decade that have demanded (especially) humanitarian attention (Powell & Seddon 1997).

Such moves towards some semblance of economic integration will have to come from within the geographical constraints that in many ways, as Thurow (1996) illustrates, have precluded the countries of sub-Sahara Africa (‘the marginalized economic losers of the world’) from the major regional trading blocks (p. 120). Hirst and Thompson (1992) saw that with less developed countries (LDCs) their position is likely to only deteriorate at best, especially if pushed towards protectionism as a result of being subjugated by the global market (p. 392). As a contrast to this Krugman (1994) indicates that first world prosperity is perceived to be threatened by Third World growth, mainly concerning labor value (He goes on to refute this perception as Western paranoia).

Dickenson et al. (1983) rightly points out that not all regions can be expected to have the same political structure; the reflection of this can be in the development policy undertaken as inferred by Gertzel (1994: 40). This issue becomes particularly poignant when examining the criteria used by financing nations that can be para-political, although with the end of the Cold War this has become less of an issue. However, the effect of African socialism as part of the historical topography should not be ignored (see Hoyle, 1978). Notwithstanding, the continuation of predominantly authoritarian regimes in much of Africa has led to inertia with respect to political and economic reform (Walle 1994). In the context of the Cold War, the Third World was ‘splintered’ into the winners (the little tigers), potential winners (Thailand or Malaysia), those integrating with global capitalism (China) and the losers (Africa) (Thurow 1996: 5) (The losers of Thurow are the ‘Fourth World’ presented in Gertzel 1994: 40). This is reflected in one of the negative unifying factors of the Third World—the perception that they are being excluded by the rich world that increasingly trades within itself and the newly industrialized countries (Hirst & Thompson 1995: 421).

Fryer (1958) recognised that aid given by the West to poorer nations while admirable for recognising their responsibility, was not altogether altruistic as they sought political advantage (p. 284). However, Harding (1997) suggests the decline in the strategic importance of African nations to the West (and former East), along with the ‘disgraces’ of the United Nations in Somalia, Rwanda and the Western Sahara, and the unwillingness of investment capital to be risked in the region, has brought about a time of ‘rolling instability’ in the 1990s (p. 94).

Many LDCs, and especially those in East Africa, have been shown to be either moderately or strongly inward orientated (protectionist) (see Clark 1995). This corresponds with the ‘conventional’ approach by LDCs to encourage import substitution industrialisation (Nixson 1982; Clark 1995: 3-4). It has also been recognised that the capacity of the state to manage effective institutions also hampers national development i.e. tax collection, business regulation (see Fafchamps 1994; Brigaldino 1996).

The natural resource distribution across third world nations varies considerably. Climatic and physical regimes play a fundamental role in the distribution of resources amongst the East African countries as well as the stability of governments in their capacity to utilise resources. Djibouti for example has no natural resources as such (Kadamy 1996: 511), a factor of its geography, small size and ethnic conflict. Sudan, like Djibouti, is rife with ethnic violence and is climatically quite inhospitable. However, it is a large nation and has oil deposits (Tekle 1996: 502). Uncertainty about rainfall, compounded by destruction of agricultural facilities and land degradation via both (the independence) war and desperate populations, has seen the food production of Eritrea often in deficit despite stable government (Makki 1996:492). However, the fisheries of the Red Sea have been largely under-exploited, and show potential for development (Makki 1996: 492). Potential for fisheries development along the littoral zone of East Africa is a significant common resource that may be seen as playing an increasingly important role in the future. (It is worth noting that the motives for colonization of Africa by Europeans was to secure access to natural resources to fuel the European industrial growth: colonial laws were structured around this motive, including land annexation (Kameri-Mbote & Cullet 1997: 23-24).)

Population distribution varies in tropical Africa (O’Conner 1988: 346). However, it is widely recognized that tropical Africa will be the region most under the intense pressure of a growing population that will not be able to feed itself or have the socio-economic infrastructure to supplant depravation (see Thurow 1996: 88-89). Such population pressure in Africa is not a new phenomenon, as Macchia (1955) noticed. Indeed, much literature from international organizations, such as the United Nations, World Bank and their derivatives, have especially since the early 1970s have had as a central theme population pressure an impediment regarding third world development.

One of the themes that emerge from the Third World is how much problems result from internal problems, or influences of the outside world (O’Conner 1988: 357) (i.e they see to be susceptible to instability). In the case of many tropical African countries, much of their orientation in terms of trade is oriented toward raw material exports, mainly to the developed world (see O’Conner 1988: 357). As such, remittances from sales can vary according to the commodity markets, making revenue/transfer payments difficult to budget for. Additionally, a wide distribution of revenue benefits to the country’s populace has not been forthcoming (O’Conner 1988: 357). Indeed, as O’Conner (1988) and Biya (1988) illustrate, foreign debt has been an increasing commonality in tropical Africa (p. 358-359; 7). This however, is not a recent occurrence as Macchia (1955) probably inadvertently pre-empted, and Kamarck (1964) who began to foresee a disturbing trend, indicated. Underlying this is the historical dominance of a generally low marginal productivity of labor in African states and an equally low marginal productivity of efficient capital (Gapinski 1996). Further to this is the prevalence of unemployment in many third world nations, especially amongst the young (see for example Markakis 1996:473).

There was a perception of Third World economies that they would, soon after independence, be regularly or conventionally structured and be self-sustaining (see Kamarck 1964; Prothero 1973b: 476; Fordham 1974: 87-88; Coulson 1982). However, this was not to be the case, as Fafchamps (1994) alludes to (p. 2). The ‘essential institutions’ of finance, economics, politics, administrative or education are often insufficiently developed to ensure some stability and basis for growth (Scott 1992: 215). This, as a result of colonialism delineating the relationship between the land and traditional ownership systems has lead to an erosion of inter-personal relationships and gave arise, amongst other issues, to the idea of poverty destroying the environment (Kameri-Mbote & Cullet 1997), extending into the vicious circle dilemma.

The countries of the African Indian Ocean littoral, while classed as Third World are not without some hope—a hope of sustained development arising from economic unity that recognizes the ethnic and cultural diversity of its various peoples. Despite the current poverty, population pressure, political structure and unattractiveness as an investment area, the littoral countries will eventually resolve these issues under their own cultural temporal expectations. The role of the more developed countries should be to give the LDCs more leeway in terms of trade and expectations of political reform. Additionally, the tools of market capitalism should be made available to those wishing to use them to shape the development of their countries under the overarching ideal of free and equitable trade. This will provide all nations—DCs, NICs, LDCs—with at least one unifying feature.
 
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