Introduction
In this research I’m trying to conceptualise the 'final human temporal outcome' and the effect such a perspective necessarily imposes on ethical choices on contemporary technology. The thesis that is central to this paper holds that the final outcome of a human temporal evolutionary path is often ignored or less than adequately accounted for in the literature concerning the interaction of technology and ethics. Ultimately, 'meaning of life' questions can be contracted into those asked by Scholem (1980) where; what is technology striving for and what is ethics striving for (p.31)? i.e. where does humanity want to be in the future? In many ways I’m positive about technological development in that it will be the tool used to achieve the future vision as I illustrate here. It is in the context of vision generating that human reason guides the direction of technology to achieve the final temporal outcome.
For the purposes of my argument here, technology is defined as anything that is a physical creation of human endeavours to improve at a base level individual (or group) responses to the whole environment. Whilst technology has often been seen as either a liberator or alienator of society (i.e. Barbour 1970; 1992:3; Nisbit 1971:50; Wigner 1977;131) the issue that should be examined is the vision society has which can then be correlated to the dimensions of ethical decision making in achieving this vision. I attempt to formulate the argument of a need to create a vision of the final temporal outcome of humanity in the light of the contemporary technology ethic. Stating such a vision carries with it the risk of being open to charges of utopian fantasising, however, it is hope the logic will carry it through!
Technology and its Outcomes
The first task in the search of evidence between the relationship between technology and ethics and the final temporal outcome is to isolate technology. Technology is distinct from science: science is the ‘spiritual arm’ of technology, its work needs to precede the development of technical applications which means that science leads to something useful (Mumford 1970:110-111; see also Wilhelmsen & Bret 1970:3). The progress of technology then may be perceived as something that assures humans of future good and happiness (Ellul 1980:205; Peranio 1980:120) effectively through control over the environment (Mumford 1970:164; Brandon 1980:121; Bellini 1986:5). The success of technology in achieving such control has, however, been a failure according to Bolter (1984:74). It is posited that the perception of failure have also seen the outgrowth of 'doomsday' literature, especially about the effects of nuclear proliferation (for example Ehrlich et al. 1984; also see Dickson 1988) as well as being displayed in many popular culture images, such as Dr Who, Star Wars, Star Trek and so on as the enemies that sought domination over peace-loving humanoids. Technology as such has been seen as something that has been used by social man to achieve a dominance over nature, and each other (or some insidious non-human enemy) via power struggles (see Ellul 1980; Bell 1988; Dickson 1988:3).This may be extended into the comments of Foucault (1988) where the power outcome is domination by the state (p.3), or dominant group, through which only a few are in command and control positions (see also Mumford 1934:269; 1952:4; 1956:161; 1970:146,164; Barbour1970:62-63; Light 1997:186). Equal access to power, which can be produced via a vision for humanity which necessitates technological development aligned with this need has the potential to fulfil such equality.
The integration of technology into human culture and use in the environment has been, if nothing else, subtle in its forms. Its origins have been in the intuition and ability of humans to perceive that there is often ‘more than meets the eye’ in nature (Mumford 1956:14). Language has also fallen 'victim' to techno-social integration where for example the language of architecture and planning is being transferred to the information technology field (i.e. electronic city, virtual pubs, information superhighway etc.) reshaping our perspective and interpretation of nature (Light 1997:181). As such, the disassociation between natural, physical space towards a virtual nature space can be transferred to the community at large (Light 1997:183). While outwardly negative, this provides a view whereby physical space is transcended, therefore negating the economic concept of factor endowments which have lead to unequal access to resources (see Mumford 1934:387).
In a temporal sense, technology has become a part of human culture, although separate as a social system, allowing individuals to be seen as separate rather than organic forms (Nisbet 1971:51). Popular American culture sees technology as a force that exists separate from society; it is not a social phenomenon, and as a consequence the changes it brings about are not seen as a negative on social transformation (Downey 1995:200). The outcome has seen technology become responsible for a new sociology (Hill 1988:25), perhaps one where technology has imposed an order on society that was previously commanded by ‘gods and absolute monarchs’; the ‘I will’ has turned into the ‘I must’ in this new sociology (Mumford 1934:362; see also Mumford 1952:88; Barbour 1970:68; Bell 1988:23). At the same time, with the preponderance of the technological baggage, the evolution of the ‘Organisational Man’ has seen the projection of part of this personality in mechanical instruments, which are in turn re-enforcing this projection by ‘eliminating any non-conforming organic or human functions’: decisions thus made are value-judgementless (Mumford 1970:278). While work has been de-humanised, it has paradoxically seen the 'hominization' of the machine (Mumford 1970:152). This can be viewed as the liberating and extending capability of technology as an adjunct and extension of a mortal human experience into extra-temporal and spatial existence. While it may lead to the wholly human-organic deconstruction or cohesive disassociation of society, it will see evolution into the extra-temporal and spatial existence if allowed to become the ultimate human evolutionary outcome.
Technology as an Outgrowth of Human Culture
Negative outcomes of technology have often been expressed. This can be seen the outcome of a lack of recognition between the human need to achieve a quality of life beyond that of past generations by what is essentially better environmental adaptation. Technology, as it stands, is variously seen as responsible for the development of a world culture (Mumford 1956:161; see also Wiener 1954); and responsible for the decrease in the 'biological diversity' of the world technology pool (Mumford 1956:123; 1970:155-156; see also Beamish 1995). If any part of the technological system falls away it is claimed that it will lead to its consequent destruction due to its homogeneity or deceased diversity (Butzer 1980:279; Hill 1988:230). This view is only valid if technology is not seen as part of an organic outgrowth of human expression of environmental adaptation.
‘By turning our environment over to the machine we have robbed the machine of the one promise it held out—that of enabling us to humanise more thoughoughly the details of our existence’ (Mumford 1955:166). The qualifier Mumford (1956) uses in regards to the uses of technology and the impact on human development is that such technological resources have only been available for a short time (really since the mid-1800s) and have as yet not been shaped to human needs (p.162). However, Mumford (1966) was optimistic that the positive outcomes of civilisation as it has developed over time have outweighed the negative effects, thus the net benefit has accumulated to the whole of mankind (p.186). While this does well for hindsight, the transposition to contemporary society should not have the values of the past as a guide for how humans ought to live—live meaning something to live for in the future (or why live if there is nothing to live for?). The choices made on how to live can be determined ethical only if the vision for the future is established. Without the vision and decisions on how it will be achieved, the ethics that adheres to precedent as principles can not adapt to change. It becomes the proverbial 'stick in the mud' while all else changes with the only reference in the past that can not adapt to new pressures which effect existence itself.
Contemporary Ethical Contemplation of Technology
Standpoint matters—it may influence not only outcomes but the steps of analysis along the way (Wolf 1996:15). If, as Singer (1994) states, ethics is about how we ought to live and what makes an action right (p.3), then how can this action be measured? Judging an act can be viewed from either the 'consequentialist' point of view where the right or wrong is in accordance with the best outcome, or conversely, judgement on an act whether it is right or wrong by some principle (Singer 1994:243). It is argued in this paper that judgement from the perspective of the first point of view is only valid if the future vision has been established; from that all actions must be legitimised in achieving this vision in the most efficient manner possible, any action which can hinder such an achievement may be considered unethical as it delays, in effect, salvation. The latter point of view may be subject to stagnation and irrelevancy if the principles are based on precedent, and not with the final vision, vis the 'stick in the mud' scenario. It is clear that both views on the approaches taken to ethics, if they are to be valid, must have a final vision for humanity, without it they can not keep apace of the human nature to inquire, experiment and develop new technologies which should not be seen as distinct from society but as part of the social process (see Nisbet 1971:41).
The evidence for the potential for stagnation due to a lack of vision lays in the nature of ethical divisions in biotechnology. For example, arguments for reproductive technology are based on both alleviating suffering and arguments against on the grounds that one change will lead to others given the porosity of 'suffering' (see Strathern 1995:31-32). Both arguments are flawed if there is no vision. This is especially true for the latter argument, given the consequences of change across a broad scale are feared on the grounds of the unknown; the unknown being a consequence of lack of vision. An example where vision has translated into a technological solution is the use of nuclear deterrents (as separate from the use of the weapon). A nuclear deterrent can be seen as an ethical 'given' if it defends people against attack (Brennan 1977:175-176; Gusterson 1995:265), an attack that would see the vision for that society overrun by a contrary vision. It may therefore be stated that a nuclear deterrent (or any deterrent) that seeks to protect a vision of society is an ethical use of technology.
While much attention has been focused on the aspects of social life and its relationship with technology, it has been necessary to show that technology is pervasive in society as a whole. Its impact on ethical decision making will only become a force when it is given social meaning central to society (Nisbet 1971:39) (vis nuclear deterrents). This meaning can only come from vision. Peranio (1980) suggests that Freud, Einstein and Norbert Wiener felt that the individual and collective responsibility of humans was to continuously improve the values of the past (p.120). To continuously improve implies progress in more than just the field of ethics as it would have no reason to improve if there were not any countervailing forces or vision that spurs a need for improvement. This is a theme picked up on by Brandon (1980), who goes a step further in enunciating that as the technology of control over the environment becomes more sophisticated, so does the ethics that underlay it (p.121). The hazard of vision applied to technology and its effect on the way the world is perceived takes on significance as it becomes viewed through a series of what Hill (1988) has termed ‘technological filters’ (p.39)—human experience is mediated by technology or machines (Hill 1988:41). Therefore, to avoid such a dilemma, technology needs to given social meaning if ethical meaning is to be given to its activities (see Nisbet 1971). Social meaning should have a vision for where society wants to be in the future in terms of its relationship between the individuals and the environment.
The Final Outcome—Creating the Vision
Finally, the thesis may be expanded upon now that the views of the technology-ethics relationship as they stand in the literature has been covered. In summary, I find that technology can both help and hinder human progress from which ethical decisions are thus derived. Progress, in whatever field, necessitates the reappraisal of ethics as a whole as human understanding progresses. The argument I’ve made is that these views are formed on a fallacy which has ignored the vision of a final temporal outcome for human evolution, and thus ethics can hamstring contemporary technological decision making.
There is no doubt that humans, like other biological entities evolve (adapt to the environment) over time. What distinguishes humans from other animals is the ability for inquiry into nature (Mumford 1956:15). The tools for this inquiry is technology. However, inquiry for the sake of it serves no end (vis science/technology relationship). It is hypothesised that the technological outcomes, where technology is used as an aid for environmental adaptation, modification and domination is a natural human event given human inquiry. The purpose is to reach a state of existence where living in any environment is made possible, where Le Corbusier (1947;1929) saw that a melding between the physical environment and the physiological and sentimental needs of humans occurs to allow total satisfaction achieved in the human created environment (p.243). Biological population increase over a limited habitable area is unsustainable given a constant technology (this has been a point of intense discussion derived from Thomas Malthus for many years and is universally recognised, see Meadows et al. 1972). As such, to counter this restriction, technology has developed over time to increase the utility of both habitable and marginal land. What then when land does run out? Where does that leave the vision of human progress? What fate humanity? The vision for humanity must be formulated form such questions. To ignore or delay the formulation of a vision is to make all ethics irrelevant. Holding onto the ethical constructs formulated on relativist perceptions ignores change and growth, and ultimate individual and group freedom. It at the very leat condemns all humanity to an equilibrium punctured by times of rises and declines in quality of life. Technology with vision can solve this dilemma.
The vision is thus:
The ultimate achievement of humanity is the transcendence of time and space brought about by the integration of the physical constructs of human endeavours (technology) and the biologic systems of humans.
In effect, the suggestion is that the ultimate human is the result of human ability displayed in the melding of the technical and biologic. Humans created technology as an aid to cope with the circumstances life on the planet, so it is part of the expression of what human are and what they can become if carried through to the ultimate extreme: integrating human creations, with humans themselves. The vision is akin to a group collective as variously explored by such contemporary authors as William Gibson and Neil Stephenson.
The vision provided in this paper gives direction to where the physical and social restrictions of the earth or hostile environments can be transcended. Technological development guided by this vision is the only path to achieving the ultimate ethical outcomes which emerge from this view. As such, an ethic which prevents total human unity and liberation from physically restricted temporal and spatial existence; an ethic which disallows the full exploitation of human mental capability as expressed through maximising existence, is unethical in the extreme.
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